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Abstract
This study examines how the Twittersphere talked
about candidates running for the U.S senate in the 2018
congressional elections. We classify Twitter users as
Liberal or Conservative to better understand how the
two groups use social media during a major national
political election. Using tweet sentiment, we assess how
the Twittersphere felt about in-group party versus outgroup party candidates. When we further break these
findings down based on the candidates’ gender, we find
that male senatorial candidates were talked about more
positively than female candidates. We also find that
Conservatives talked more positively about female
Republican candidates than they did about Republican
male candidates. Female candidates of the out-group
party were talked about the least favorably of all
candidates. Conservative tweeters exhibit the most
positive level of in-group party sentiment and the most
negative level of out-group party sentiment. We
therefore attribute the most intense affective
polarization to this ideological group.

1. Introduction
Partisan polarization in the United States Congress
is at the core of many challenges that Congress faces in
order to become more effective [33]. It increases
gridlock, decreases the quality of the legislation that
guides the governance of the country, and harms the
functioning of the executive and judicial branches of
government [37]. Unfortunately, the level of partisan
polarization has increased in the 21st century. In part
this has been in reaction to watershed events such as the
presidential elections of 2000, 2008 and 2016 [44, 45]
and the confirmation of six justices to the Supreme
Court by the U.S. Senate [12].
When discussing partisan polarization it is important
to distinguish between different types of polarization.
For example, ideological polarization is the extent to
which the ideological policy positions differ between
parties [2] whereas affective polarization is the extent to
which supporters of one party (or group) dislike the
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members of other parties (or other groups) [27]. While
most studies, when measuring partisan polarization,
have focused on ideological polarization, the focus of
this work is to examine affective polarization. It is vital
that we understand the drivers of this type of
polarization since affective polarization can lead to
democratic erosion [19]. As the general public
increasingly turns to social media for their source of
information [53], and partisan discourse leads to an
increase in affective polarization [38, 50], it is important
to understand the discourse on social media during
election campaigns [49].
Even though progress has been made towards
decreasing the gender disparity among public officials
at many levels of government [17], it is important to
measure, track, and understand how this disparity is
changing over time [52]. Specifically, it is important to
unpack to what extent the projection of gender
stereotypes onto congressional candidates is being
perpetuated during national elections [13, 16, 18, 25,
26].
It is ironic that at a time when the language of
polarization has become male stereotyped, e.g., using
words like warfare, warriors, and combatants [22, 30,
46], that women voters have the most power to shape
the future of partisan polarization as they vote.
According to Carroll and Fox [8], women are the largest
demographic block of registered voters in the U.S. and
about 9.9 million more women voted than men in the
2016 election.

1.1. Affective Polarization
The main goals of this study are to a) determine
whether affective polarization can be measured using
Twitter data and b) to unpack affective polarization, as
it is expressed on Twitter [28], to better understand what
may be driving this polarization. Iyengar et al. [27],
using data from the American National Election Study
(ANES), measure affective polarization as the
difference between mean in-party feeling and mean outparty feeling. They show that affective polarization has
significantly increased over the last three decades. We
propose and define a Twitter-based measure of affective
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polarization as the difference between mean in-group
party tweet sentiment [48] and mean out-group party
sentiment [29]. This Us-versus-Them [19] measure
provides a way to quantify the level of mass affective
polarization, by measuring the animosity between
ideological groups or political parties, in near real-time.
We use the U.S. Senate elections in 2018 as the
empirical context to test the validity of this measure and
use the tweets gathered about (or by) candidates running
for Senate to unpack what is behind affective
polarization on Twitter. We will unpack the data based
upon four different dimensions:
 Ideology and gender of Twitter user; and,
 Party and gender of senatorial candidate(s)
mentioned in the tweet.
Through this analysis we will better understand what
role gender plays, both the gender of the citizen as well
as gender of the candidate, with respect to affective
polarization.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
The next section is a literature review focused on
partisan polarization and differences and disparities in
U.S. politics and elections that are driven by party and
gender. Section 3 describes our data and methods.
Section 4 presents and discusses our results. Section 5
presents our conclusions and we cover limitations and
future work in Section 6.

2. Polarization, Party and Gender
Mass partisan polarization among citizens is most
commonly measured using surveys and focus groups
[36] and has focused on ideological polarization [2].
During an election cycle such tools are supplemented
with frequent opinion polls [1]. Since roll-call votes,
answers to questions, coded interview data, and
responses to polls are very often tied to the party and
gender of a public official, a candidate, or a respondent,
the data produced by these instruments has been of keen
interest to many scholars, e.g., [8, 31]. Of course, such
research has sometimes focused on the connections
between polarization and party [51], gender [43], or
both [16, 26]. In the age of social media, this work has
been extended to determine and characterize differences
in public opinion and sentiment on a variety of topics [3,
41, 47, 49]. Within this body of work, Twitter has
increasingly played a key role, rapidly speeding up both
the scope of political campaigns and their coverage
while providing researchers with a rich source of data.
Tweets reflect the thoughts of millions of people in
real-time. In 280 characters or less, a candidate,
journalist, or voter can publish their thoughts for others
to see. While discussions questioning the validity of
polls and their predictive power on election outcomes

have increasingly circulated since Donald Trump’s
victory in 2016, Twitter’s role has only broadened,
transforming it into a catalyst for political
communication as well as a gauge for public opinion
[24, 53].

2.1. Measuring Twitter-Based Affective
Polarization
Early work in the social media era analyzed online
citizen sentiment and emotion with the goal of
measuring public opinion [42] and even predicting
election results [7]. However, systematic ways of
making complex inferences like predicting the results of
an election remained, and continue to be, elusive [20].
The present study extends the work of Conover,
Dang-Xuan, Iyengar, Steiglitz and others [10, 11, 27,
28, 29, 48] by proposing to systematically measure
affective polarization as the difference between
sentiment about one’s own party (in-group party) [48]
and sentiment about opposing parties (out-group
parties) [29] as expressed on Twitter.
While we expect affective polarization to be evident,
we are cognizant that using social media data comes
with some concerns. In particular, the n=all fallacy [34],
which is the assumption that, through the use of “big
data,” scholars can position their arguments as universal
– based on digital trace data – even though these traces
might be influenced by social media companies or other
organizations [53], and are likely skewed to a younger
population than the general public. These limitations
thus motivate the exploratory nature of this study.

2.2. Gender Differences and Disparity
The existence of gender stereotyping in American
politics has been clearly documented, e.g. in [13].
Research in this area has focused on a variety of topics,
including the successes and failures of women in
elections [14, 15, 40] and the nature and tone of
discourse surrounding women in the public sphere [38].
Even though the link between gender and political
representation has evolved, stereotypes can play a role
in the actions of voters and women have yet to be seen
as equals in the political arena [8].
Differing expectations among voters regarding the
capabilities of a politician are routinely based on gender,
providing the most consistent evidence to prove the
existence of gender stereotyping in politics [43, 54]. In
response successful women have recognized where they
stand among voters and have crafted their strategy
accordingly. The challenge that female candidates must
endure within this process is to wage campaigns that
showcase any dispositions toward gender as an asset
rather than a liability [4, 14, 26].
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The present climate of partisan polarization and the
rapid and efficient transmission of polarizing messages
via social media present many challenges to researchers.
In general, what means do we have to understand how
Liberal and Conservative voters evaluate male and
female candidates? We used the following research
questions to guide this research:
 RQ1: Can Twitter be used to measure affective
polarization?
 RQ2: Does affective polarization differ by ideology
or gender of the Twitter user?
 RQ3: Does the party or gender of a candidate affect
the level of affective polarization on Twitter?
 RQ4: In the context of congressional elections, does
tweet content provide hints as to what issues or
events might be fueling affective polarization?

3. Data and Methods
This study uses data from a 7-week time frame from
September 27 through November 13, 2018. This
represents 6 weeks leading up to the election and a week
post-election.
There were 33 senate races in the 2018 elections
with 102 candidates on the ballots. We identified the
primary Twitter handle for 87 candidates; the remainder
of the candidates did not have a Twitter account. A
Python script using the Twitter Listener API in the
Twython library [39] was developed and deployed using
the list of handles. Overall we collected 17,178,617
tweets. However, the Twitter API does not just look in
the tweet text alone for a match but also looks at URLs,
screen names, etc. We filtered the tweets down to those
that specifically mentioned at least one candidate in the
text of the tweet itself. This reduced our overall tweet
dataset down to 12,595,639.

3.1. Ideological Affinity
Accurately predicting political alignment or
tendencies has been of significant interest. Many
techniques have been employed with varying success.
Some of the more popular techniques employed when
analyzing Twitter data have been keyword, or hashtag,
analysis, analyzing the follower network, and analyzing
the retweet network. Conover et al. [10] report a 95%
success rate when utilizing the retweet approach. We
should note that others have found this approach not as
successful when the conversation being analyzed was
non-political [9]. Since our conversation is political in
nature, we adopted this approach.
From our database of tweets we identified and
extracted the retweets. These were then used to identify
how frequently someone retweeted someone else. This

data was used to build a weighted and directed social
network which we imported into the networking tool
Gephi [6]. Only those users who either retweeted
someone else, or were retweeted by someone, were
imported into Gephi. Users who didn’t participate in
retweeting were excluded. While our approach forced us
to exclude users who did not participate in retweeting,
we feel this was justified since the primary motivation
for political speech is to spread the message which is
accomplished through retweets. The result was 1.4M
unique Twitter users identified as retweet participants
with 4.7M weighted connections between those
participants.
Using the Gephi software tool, we used this
weighted directed network to identify communities
within the network. Gephi found 484,701 communities.
While the number of individual communities was quite
large, we found that we could account for 63% of
participants by using the top 10 communities, with each
participant being assigned to one and only one
community. Once we moved beyond the top 10
communities, the subsequent communities represented
0.11% or less of the total number of nodes.
To assign an ideological affinity to each community
we looked at the top 10 retweeted users in each and
manually classified these accounts as Liberal or
Conservative. These are the users whose message is
being spread the most by the community and therefore,
we argue, best represent the ideology of that
community. For example, the largest community
represents 28.59% of all nodes with the top two
retweeted accounts managed by anti-Trump brothers
Brian and Ed Krassenstein (these accounts have since
been banned by Twitter). This network was classified as
Liberal. The second largest network represents 21.71%
of all nodes with the number one retweeted account
being @realdonaldtrump (President Trump’s personal
Twitter account). This network was classified as
Conservative.
In all communities with the exception of one
discussed below, the top 10 accounts matched in their
ideological affinity. In the final case it was unclear
which ideology to assign to this community based on the
top 10 accounts. In this case the top retweeted accounts
were all discussing immigration issues related to
professionals coming mainly from Asian countries. The
primary accounts did not appear to be promoting one set
of candidates over the other. We will discuss why we
classified these accounts as Liberal next.
Following the manual classification, we used Gephi
to visualize the network using the Force Atlas 2 layout
algorithm [32]. As can be seen in Figure 1, two large
distinct communities emerged and appear as the dark
pink (the primary Liberal community) and green (the
primary Conservative community). Barberá et al. [5]
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found a similar clear pattern of two distinct ideologies
when displaying the follower network in the 2012
election. Using proximity to these two communities we
validate the classification of each sub-community. In all
cases, our manual classification was supported by the
proximity to primary community. For the immigration
community (shown as a small purple community to the
left of the Liberal communities) we found that it truly
was segmented off to the side, however there were more
connections into the other Liberal communities than into
the Conservative communities and, as such, we
classified this community as Liberal.
Next we exported the community information out of
Gephi in order to assign an ideological affinity back to
our tweet dataset. Using the community identification,
and the membership of each user, we were able to assign
the community back to the original tweet dataset,
including those that were not involved in retweets.
While we only manually classified the top 10
communities which represented 63.09% of those
accounts who were involved with retweeting, those
accounts represented 78.9% of all the tweets gathered
during our 7-week period. This represents just under
10M tweets and is the dataset we used for the rest of our
analysis. (See Table 2 in the online Appendix.) Overall,
the split of total tweets was 50% Liberal and 50%
Conservative showing that both ideological groups had
the same level of discussion occurring.

3.2. Sentiment
Next we scored each tweet for sentiment. We began
by stripping all punctuation from the tweet text. Each
tweet was scored for sentiment using the Python
TextBlob library [35]. Sentiment score ranges from -1
(extremely negative) to +1 (extremely positive). For
example, the following retweet was scored -1.0
(extremely negative):
“rt harrietbaldwin amyklobuchar you are going to
lose disgusting duplicitous democrat”
and this tweet was scored 1.0 (extremely positive):
“the very best man to serve all connecticut
residents without bias❗️
vote mattcoreyct takebackct”

3.3. Gender Classification
To identify the gender of the Twitter user we used
the Python based Gender-guesser library [21]. This
package predicts a gender based on the first name. We
broke out the Twitter username and used the first word
in that name as the first name. Each name was classified
as either female, male, mostly-female, mostly-male,
androgynous or unknown. We grouped these results into

male (including male and mostly-male), female
(including female and mostly female), and unknown
(including androgynous and unknown). While we see

Figure 1. Social network of retweet network
significant differences in sentiment for the male, female,
and unknown groups, the mostly-male, mostly-female,
and androgynous groups become impossible to
distinguish. This is expected considering each of these
groups would have varying levels of males and females.
As a result, when analyzing gender we used just the pure
groups and did not include the “mostly” groups.

3.4. Other Classifications
Finally, each tweet was classified as male-only,
female-only, or combination, depending on the
candidates mentioned in the tweet. A similar approach
was then used to classify each tweet as mentioning
Democrat-only candidates, Republican-only candidates,
Other-party-only candidates, or some combination of
parties mentioned.

4. Results
The average sentiment score across all tweets
mentioning any candidates was .0861, meaning, overall,
the tweets were more positive than they were negative.
49% of the tweets were neutral (sentiment = 0), 35%
positive (sentiment > 0), and 16% negative (sentiment <
0). This distribution of positive/neutral/negative tweets
is similar to results found in the 2016 [23].
When broken down by the ideology of the tweeter,
tweets from Liberals were more positive
(sentiment=0.0851) than those originating from
Conservatives (sentiment=0.0779, p < .0001). There
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were approximately 5 million tweets for each of the two
ideologies indicating that neither ideology dominated
the senate discussion in the Twittersphere. Both had
68% of tweets being retweets and 32% being original
tweets. Retweets tended to be more positive (sentiment
= 0.0947) than original tweets (sentiment = 0.0535).

4.1. Asymmetry of Affective Polarization
While we find that Liberals tweet more positively
than Conservatives, what happens when either discusses
their own in-group party or the out-group party
(opposing party)? Figure 2a shows the average
sentiment score across all 7 weeks based on the ideology
of the tweeter broken down by whether the tweet
discusses the in-group party only, the opposing party
only, or some combination of parties. The sentiments in
this figure show us that Conservatives tweet more
positively about their own (in-group) candidates, and
more negatively about opposing candidates than
Liberals. When candidates from multiple parties are
discussed within the same tweet then Conservatives
tweet slightly more favorably than Liberals.

Figure 2a. Sentiment towards candidates by
tweeter’s ideology
Recall that our measure of affective polarization is
the difference between in-group party sentiment and
out-group party sentiment. While we can see this
difference by comparing the spread of the bars in Figure
2a, Figure 2b goes into more detail by showing the range
of the overall daily affective polarization across the 7
weeks. The larger median difference (or greater
asymmetry) for Conservatives indicates a higher level
of affective polarization. The larger range of both the
overall bar, and the 50th percentile, for Conservatives
indicates that this ideological group also had wider
fluctuations in polarization over the 7-week period. This
is our first key finding: The level of affective
polarization is greater amongst Conservatives than it is
amongst Liberals.

Figure 2b. Asymmetry of Affective Polarization

4.2. Gender Differences and Polarization
When considering the gender of the tweeter, several
findings come to light. Figure 3a shows the average
sentiment score for the party of the candidate broken
down by ideology and gender of the tweeter. For both
ideologies, women talk more positively about their ingroup party candidate. A one-way ANOVA between
groups show that there was no difference in groups
when talking about the out-group (or opposing) party
candidate, with the exception of Liberal men who talk
more favorably about Republicans than any other group
when talking about their opposing party.

Figure 3a. Sentiment towards candidates by
tweeter’s gender and ideology

Figure 3b. Average daily polarization by
tweeter’s gender and ideology
Figure 3b shows the range of daily polarization
broken out by the gender of the tweeter (see Table 2 and
Table 3 in the online Appendix for descriptive
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statistics). We can see that for both ideological groups,
women score higher in their level of polarization.
Liberals are less polarized than Conservatives, however,
we again observe more daily fluctuation among
Conservatives.

4.3. Candidate Gender and Polarization
In order to understand whether the gender of the
candidate has any impact on sentiment, we begin by
classifying each tweet as “Female-Only”, “Male-Only”,
or “Both” depending on who was mentioned in each
tweet. Figure 4 shows the average sentiment score based
on this classification by the gender of the tweeter.

What is surprising about this result is that there were
more Democratic female candidates (n=15) than there
were Republican female candidates (n=6), and given
that people talked more positively about their in-group
candidates than the out-group party candidates, it was
expected that Liberals would talk more positively about
female candidates than Conservatives.

4.4. Candidate Gender and Party
To better understand the unexpected findings from
Figure 5, we break out sentiment based on all four
categories; ideology and gender of the tweeter and
gender and party of the candidate. We can see in Figure
6 that candidate party does indeed make a significant
difference when evaluating sentiment based on
candidate gender.
Regardless of the gender of the tweeter, Liberals
talked more positively about male candidates than they
did about female candidates. Conservatives talked much
more positively about in-group party female candidates
than male candidates. Across all groups, female
candidates of the out-group party had the lowest overall
sentiment score.

Figure 4. Sentiment towards candidates by
their gender and by tweeter’s gender
We see that both men and women talk more
favorably about male candidates than they do about
female candidates. Figure 5 shows the sentiment further
broken down by the ideology of the tweeter. Keep in
mind that overall women talked more positively about
men than they did about women.
Figure 6. Sentiment towards different
candidates by tweeter’s ideology and gender

4.5. Drivers of Affective Polarization

Figure 5. Sentiment towards candidates by their
gender and by tweeter’s gender and ideology
Figure 5 also shows that party affiliation plays a
strong role in this measure. Both Liberals and
Conservatives talk more positively about male
candidates than female candidates. Liberals talk least
favorably about female candidates and have a much
wider discrepancy between male and female candidates.

Given that our measure of polarization is in-group
party support versus out-group party support, we can
consider that there are certain candidates, issues, and
race tenor that will push the in-group party measure
higher and the out-group party measure lower, resulting
in an increase in affective polarization.
To identify these drivers we segmented the tweets
based on the ideology of the tweeter, the party
mentioned in the tweet, and whether they are highly
positive (sentiment score >= 0.5) or highly negative
(sentiment score <= -0.5). We disregard tweets that did
not score highly (either positive or negative) so we can
focus in on the drivers of polarization. The result is eight
groups of tweets as listed in Table 1.
We then used these groups of tweets to extract the
top candidates mentioned, the top hashtags mentioned,
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and the top adjectives used. These categories give us
indicators for the drivers of affective polarization based
on candidates, issues (as seen through hashtags), and
tenor (as seen through adjectives).
We looked at the Liberals in which four of the top
five candidates being talked about positively are women
and the remaining spot is a man. Two of these
candidates (Beto O’Rourke and Dianne Feinstein) are in
both the positive and negative groups, suggesting that
the polarization pushing up the sentiment score is
somewhat offset by a decrease in the sentiment score, so
we would not classify either of these candidates as
primary drivers of polarization. This leaves the
remaining female candidates as the most positivelyrelated polarizing candidates for Liberals (Klobucher,
Sinema, and Gillibrand), while Kaine, Warren, and
Heitkamp are the Democratic candidates lessening the
polarization score since they were talked about the least
favorably.
On the other end of affective polarization is the outgroup party score. The lower the average out-group
party sentiment, the greater the overall polarization
since it increases the Us-vs-Them measure. The primary
driver of this would be the highly negative Republican
candidates. There is only one candidate (McSally) who
appears in the most negative list and whose low score is
not offset by also appearing in a number of top positive
tweets.
On the Conservative side, four Republican
candidates (Cruz, Vukmir, Heller, and Hawley) appear
in both lists (positive and negative) somewhat lessening
their impact. Patrick Morrisey is the only candidate that
is in the top 5 most positively talked about Republican
candidates, but is not also in the top 5 most negatively
talked about list.
Pushing Conservative affective polarization up is the
lower average sentiment score when this group talks
about Democrats. We see all 5 candidates (4 of whom
are women) appear in both the positive and negative
lists. This means that there aren’t obvious Democratic
candidates who are driving the polarization score for
Conservatives.
A key finding from looking at the candidates is that,
on the Democratic side, female candidates are clearly
eliciting the most reaction, both positively and
negatively, across both ideological groups. However,
there is not an obvious group of candidates that is
driving polarization.
Next we examine the issues to better understand if
they are driving the polarization. Using the hashtags as
an indicator of issues driving the conversation, we see
several mentions of hashtags related to Brett Kavanaugh
(Kavanaugh’s Senate hearings took place during our
period of study), and then singular mentions of topics
#metoo, #fakenews. Notably absent are topics related to

the economy, healthcare, immigration, gun policy,
taxes, foreign affairs, etc. In fact, most of the hashtags
were focused on specific candidates or races. These
findings suggest that in addition to race-specific
discourse, affective polarization is being driven
discussions surrounding high-profile polarizing public
figures, e.g., Brett Kavanaugh and Donald Trump.
Finally we take a look at the top adjectives that
appear in the high emotion (positive or negative) tweets.
We argue that the tenor of the race can be seen through
the adjectives used in tweets. Pride is clearly felt by both
ideologies as it appears at the top of both lists. Liberals
also feel their candidates are “good” and “great” while
Conservatives also use those terms and add in
“outstanding” and “fantastic.” When discussing the outgroup party negatively. Liberals use terms such as
“sad”, “pathetic”, and “bad” while Conservatives use
terms including “bad”, “sorry”, and “evil.”

5. Conclusions
In this work we were interested in understanding if
affective polarization could be measured using Twitter.
To accomplish this, we gathered Twitter data during the
2018 U.S. Senate elections. Using average sentiment
scores, we defined a way to measure affective
polarization as the difference between sentiment about
one’s in-group party minus the sentiment about one’s
out-group party. This measure provides an additional
way to look at affective polarization through Twitter,
including being able to do so in near real-time, e.g., by
measuring polarization using daily averages.
We found a greater level of polarization, and larger
fluctuations in polarization, among Conservatives over
Liberals. Women having both Liberal and Conservative
ideologies expressed stronger in-group party support
and greater dislike of out-group party (opposing party)
candidates than did their male counterparts.
Both men and women talked more positively about
male candidates than they did about female candidates,
however, Conservatives were more apt to talk favorably
about female candidates than Liberals. The group of
candidates uniformly liked least, were female
candidates of the opposing party.
We expanded on our findings by using candidate
mentions, hashtags, and adjectives for the most strongly
worded positive and negative tweets. We find little
support that this polarization was being driven by
specific candidates or topics, with the exception of the
events leading up to Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment to
the Supreme Court on October 6. Instead we find
support that that U.S. Senate races of 2018 were
dominated by an Us-vs-Them mentality [19], with
Conservatives using the most strongly worded
terminology in support of their own (in-group)
candidates and against the opposing candidates.
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Table 1. Drivers of polarization
Most Frequently Mentioned:
Twitter
Users

Liberals

Talking
about

Democratic
Candidates

Democratic
Candidates

Republican
Candidates

Republican
Candidates

Conservatives

Democratic
Candidates

Democratic
Candidates

Republican
Candidates

Republican
Candidates

Candidates

Hashtags

Adjectives

Positively

Beto O'Rourke (D-TX)
Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ)
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)

#metoo
#votewithbeto
#flipthesenate
#betodaysarecoming
#earlyvoting

Proud
Good
Many
Great
F***ing

Negatively

Tim Kaine (D-VA)
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX)
Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)
Heidi Heitkamp (D-ND)

#trump
#virginia
#johnkelly
#kavanaugh
#fakenews

Sorry
Impossible
Stupid
Angry
Bad

Positively

Ted Cruz (R-TX)
Rick Scott (R-FL)
Dean Heller (R-NV)
Josh Hawley (R-MO)
Leah Vukmir (R-WI)

#betofortexas
#texasdebate
#nevada
#kavanaugh
#votebeto

Good
More
Happy
Great
Sexual

Negatively

Ted Cruz (R-TX)
Leah Vukmir (R-WI)
Dean Heller (R-NV)
Josh Hawley (R-MO)
Martha McSally (R-AZ)

#betoforsenate
#betofortexas
#lyinted
#trump
#florida

Sad
Encouraging
Pathetic
Bad
Afraid

Positively

Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX)
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ)
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)

#loomered
#1024something
#votered
#confirmkavanaugh
#scotus

Good
Own
More
Sure
Great

Negatively

Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
Beto O'Rourke (D-TX)
Kyrsten Sinema (D-AZ)
Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)
Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY)

#azsen
#electionshaveconsequences
#suckituptoots
#betoorourke
#sundaythoughts

Illegal
Bad
Sorry
Evil
Fake

Positively

Ted Cruz (R-TX)
John James (R-MI)
Patrick Morrisey (R-WV)
Josh Hawley (R-MO)
Matt Rosendale (R-MT)

#txsen
#choosecruz
#cruzcrew
#keeptexasred
#michigan

Proud
Great
Good
Outstanding
Fantastic

Negatively

Ted Cruz (R-TX)
Rick Scott (R-FL)
Bob Hugin (R-NJ)
Josh Hawley (R-MO)
John James (R-MI)

#brendasnipes
#trump2020
#vasen
#redwave2018andbeyo
#nd
#nj

Crazy
Corrupt
Illegal
Sorry
Fake
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6. Limitations and Future Research
While we propose a novel measure for affective
polarization, without longitudinal data we cannot
comment on the change in this measure over time. We
have also not tried to quantify the differences in our
measures when comparing across groups other than
saying they are larger or smaller. We anticipate
exploring this in more detail by including additional
election datasets.
Our Twitter dataset relies on a gender guessing
process which left the majority of tweets classified as
from someone with unknown gender. We see some
stark differences in how these “unknown” populations
scored for sentiment between Liberals and
Conservatives (e.g., see Figure 5) which is an
opportunity for future exploration. There were also
several days during our period of study where one
ideology dipped into negative territory for affective
polarization; meaning that tweets of that day talking
about out-group party candidates were more positive
than tweets about their own candidates. These were
not gradual changes, but instead were downward
spikes when viewed over time. This happened three
times for Liberals and once for Conservatives, and
could be an indication of either specific events
occurring or a concentrated effort to drive the
conversation negatively by an external group.
Recall that our sentiment scoring mechanism is
limited to words appearing in tweets. Because of this,
tweets with only links to other sources or tweets with
no text, such as photos, were not included.
Finally, we would caution about reading too much
into the strong in-group party support for Republican
female candidates. These numbers decrease
significantly when the unknowns are included in our
analysis. Also, with only six female candidates on the
Republican side, it could swing heavily based on the
favorability (or lack thereof) of just one or two
candidates.
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